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Abstract 
Aiming at filling a gap in the literature, which has been concentrated on USA and 
Western-European Countries, this paper analyzes the Polish corporate network based on 
interlocking directorates among 125 top companies in the country. To determine the 
characteristics of the network and its implications for the business system the 
exploratory Social Network Analysis is conducted. It is found that the Polish network is 
fragmented and the interlocks appear mainly along companies from financial and 
chemical sectors. Basing on comparison with Germany it is suggested that the Polish 
network will be growing in size and density in the future. 
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Introduction 
“Networks embody a relational rather than a transactional or atomistic view of the 
organization and this brings new challenges of understanding more about the origins, 
evolution and management of relationships.” (Heracleous and Murray, 2001:138) This 
holds true especially in nowadays’ turbulent and rapidly changing business 
environment, where the inter-company ties at different organizational levels can serve 
multiple practical functions. Facilitating communication, applying mechanisms of 
cooptation and monitoring, as well as gaining access to valuable information are, among 
others, commonly thought to be the ones justifying the formation of interlocking 
directorates – ties at the board level (Dooley, 1969).  
Interlocking directorate as such occurs when a person affiliated with one 
organization sits simultaneously on the board of directors of another organization 
(Mizruchi, 1996). Combined on a country level interlocks branch out into networks 
connecting various companies through their boards of directors. Thus, being easily 
identifiable in trustworthy publicly available sources, “interlocks have become the 
primary indicator of interfirm network ties” (Mizruchi, 1996) and so have been widely 
analyzed and interpreted.  
To date however, the majority of the empirical work has been conducted in the 
United States and Western Europe, with omission of the Central and Eastern European 
countries. Poland as such one, being a prime example of successful economic 
transformation and evolution to market economy in the region, bears high potential for a 
valuable analysis of the corporate networks in this setting, for no case alike has ever 
been presented in the literature before.  
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the structure of the interlocking 
directorates in Poland given the economic and legal framework of the national business 
system (characteristics of the board system, ownership issues, governance regime, and 
the specific characteristics of the country, due to its relatively recent move to a market 
economy) (Nowak et al, 2008). In the course of analytical process the following 
research questions are being addressed: 
1. What are the characteristics of the corporate networks in Poland? What do the 
networks look like?  
2. What are the main factors determining the network characteristics? 
3. What are the implications of the network characteristics for doing business in 
Poland?  
By answering the foregoing questions the paper contributes to the existing literature 
in both, exploratory and descriptive way. Firstly, it presents the data collected and the 
statistical (quantitative and graphical) analysis. Secondly, using a comparative approach 
it positions the results obtained for the Polish interlocking directorates’ network among 
the results for other countries, formerly put forth by researchers.  
The report begins with a brief review of the existing literature on the topic of 
corporate networks and interlocking directorates. Secondly, the collected data set is 
presented and the methods applied in the analysis are explained. The next part describes 
the results obtained in the analysis followed by conclusions in a form of comparison of 
the Polish networks with those observed in other countries.    
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Research on Corporate Networks: A Brief Review 
The problem of interlocking directorates and the public discussion about it first 
flared back in the early twentieth century, when the problem was originally identified in 
the United States (Dooley, 1969). The 1913 Pujo Report (U.S. Congress, 1913) – a 
study of the industrial sector and the main New York banks – indicated that the linkages 
between competing firms were detrimental to market competition. The Clayton Act (of 
the next year) prohibited the interlocking directorates between the companies from the 
same industry, but not interlocks as such (Pennings, 1980). 
A shift in the focus of organizational studies from the internal to the environmental 
perspective in the 1970s and 1980s brought even greater attention to the researches of 
interlocking directorates as they provided a simple evidence of inter-organizational 
relations (Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 1993). From this period also date first significant 
developments in network analysis, as well as the theoretical explanations for the reasons 
underlying the creation and the existence of interlocks (Dooley, 1969; Allen, 1974; 
Pennings, 1980). 
Mizruchi (1996) presents a comprehensive review of the reasons for the formation 
of interlocking directorates distinguishing: collusion, cooptation and monitoring, 
legitimacy, career advancement, and social cohesion. These reasons argue respectively 
that the interlocks: (1) occur between competitors to facilitate horizontal integration 
(Penning, 1980), (2) are means of reducing the environmental uncertainty and implying 
control, especially over financing and access to resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
(3) can leverage the specific company’s position and power in the network (Useem, 
1979), (4) are created by individuals aiming at developing their own careers (Zajac, 
1988) or (5) represent social ties among members of the upper class (Mizruchi, 1996). 
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Another stream of literature focuses on the value that corporate network analyses 
can provide to studies on national business systems. It is argued that regardless of the 
theoretical approach, interlocking directorates’ analyses yield insight into the firms’ 
behaviors and the characteristics of the national business systems. Thus, a large share of 
the topic’s literature focuses on providing the empirical evidence of the actual extent 
and structural characteristics of the networks. The most substantial work was obviously 
conducted in the United States (Miruchi, 1982; Windolf, 2002). In Europe Windolf 
(2002) studied the data on interlocking directorates in the largest corporations in Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands, whereas van Veen and 
Kratzer (2011) compared the networks within the EU-15 countries. Single analyses 
have been conducted also in South-East Asia (Ong et al, 2003; Au et al, 2000) and 
Australia (Murray, 2000). 
The studies observed some structural differences originating in the kind of board 
system in use, specific ownership structure, governance regime, as well as the variety of 
capitalism (following another stream of literature, which will not be explored here – for 
all, see Hall and Soskice, 2011). Country-specific factors have been defined on the basis 
of the historical backgrounds and the characteristics of business systems of the countries 
(van Veen and Kratzer, 2011). Research tends to suggest that the corporate networks 
can actually serve as a simple proxy for defining the business systems of a country 
(Santella et al, 2009). 
To author’s best knowledge, however, none of the former studies confronts the topic 
with the reality of a post-communist Central-Eastern or Eastern European country. Only 
Windolf (2002) mentions the region vaguely in a rather descriptive approach not 
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substantiated in any empirical research. This already suggests a need for a more precise 
analysis in the area. 
Taking into consideration the fact that the historical determinants of doing business 
in a country with such history are considerably different from those (Western European) 
studied before, and remembering that the economic behaviors of companies are always 
embedded within a wider institutional background, this paper aims at providing a 
comprehensive analysis of the interlocking directorates in Poland and placing them in 
perspective of the former studies. Poland, over 20 years after the successful 
transformation into a market economy, is now at the high point to look at the business 
structures there and therefore provides a good starting point for including Eastern recent 
market economies into a broader analysis of corporate networks in a comparative 
perspective. 
Poland’s National Business System 
Business systems are naturally linked to the institutional environments in which they 
develop. While all market economies decentralize control over economic activities, the 
nature of relations between the entities and the way the control is exercised varies 
considerably from country to country. (Whiteley, 1992) Therefore it is crucial to put it 
in the right institutional context.  
Historical Determinants 
In the late 80s the socialist led Poland was facing substantial economic problems 
originating in the consistent lack of systemic reforms. As a result, in 1989, when the 
first post-Communist government came to power, the Polish economy demonstrated 
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several structural characteristics, craving for a radical strategy towards rapid 
transformation into the market economy (Sachs, 1992). 
The comprehensive program of reforms for Poland implemented by the new 
Minister of Economy – Leszek Balcerowicz (1997), outlined three crucial policies: the 
economic liberalization and introduction of the market competition; the macroeconomic 
stabilization and the privatization. The latter was considered the most important from 
the business system perspective, as it involved the actual transfer of ownership from the 
state to the private sector (Sachs, 1992) and in consequence enabled the restructuring of 
the state owned enterprises and the recovery of production. 
As result, Poland quickly outperformed economically all the other countries in the 
region, achieving the return to positive growth in less than three years (Kołodko, 2007). 
Furthermore, over the following eighteen years it has increased the GDP by more than 
any other post-socialist country and more importantly has exhibited the ability to 
compete in and with the Western European markets (Sachs, 1992). 
Legal Context 
The success of the Polish transformation was highly supported by the formation of 
the modern capitalistic institutions – the commercial law, private corporate ownership 
and the independent judicial system to enforce the other two (Sachs, 1992). The efforts 
put through to harmonize the Polish commercial law with the European Union’s acts 
(primarily to facilitate Poland’s accession in the EU) also played an important role in 
the process (Balcerowicz, 1997). 
As a result, the commercial companies in Poland, as we know them today, have 
been defined. Their statutory mandatory organ – Board of Directors, can consist of at 
least one individual. Supervisory Board is a complementary body; mandatory for joint-
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stock companies and optional for the limited liability ones. Most of them, however, 
choose to appoint the Supervisory Board, for its members serve as the advocates of the 
shareholders’ interests through governance and supervision of the directors.
1
 Out of the 
three main known board systems, i.e. the Anglo-American unitary system with only a 
board of directors (Great Britain, USA), the German two-tiered system with a board of 
directors and the supervisory board (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands) and the Latin 
system, allowing to either opt for one or the other (Belgium, France, Italy), Poland 
definitely follows the German model, where the executive directors run the operations, 
while the supervisory board represents the shareholders’ and employees’ interests, 
reviews the major decisions and appoints or fires the members of the board of directors 
(Whiteley, 1992). 
Importance of FDI in the Business Environment  
As a consequence of the general liberalization of the Polish economy after the 
reforms, as well as the evolution of the commercial law regarding foreign investment, 
taxation and trade, a significant inflow of large international corporations in a form of 
foreign direct investments (FDI) could be observed (Kołodko, 2007). 
Poland has become an important target for FDI primarily through privatization (the 
acquisition of the state-owned enterprises to foreign investors was finally possible) and 
the follow-up investments in earlier established ventures. The inflow of the FDI has not 
lost in pace even after the Poland’s accession to EU in 2004, exceeding the projections 
by over 20% (Ancyparowicz, 2009). 
Because of the huge role that the foreign corporations play in the Polish business 
system the analysis conducted in this paper will include the foreign-owned firms 
                                                             
1 The Act of 15 September 2000 of the Code of Commercial Companies (Journal of Laws No. 94, pos. 
1037), as amended. 
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operating in Poland. Their omission would, to the author’s best knowledge, lead to 
exclusion of an important part of the business structure. Furthermore, including the 
foreign firms in the analyzed sample may also unveil, if the interlocking directorates are 
going to be used as a way to overcome the “liability of foreignness”.     
Data and Methodology 
This exploratory study of corporate networks using the interlocking directorates as a 
proxy brings several methodological issues. The primary of them is the data set 
construction. While all the studies on corporate networks in different countries list the 
analyzed companies by their assets, the size of the samples can differ from country to 
country. The variations can originate in the specifics of the study itself, or the country 
based factors. A comparative study of current and historical situation would use 
consistent samples for both periods – usually influenced by the availability of the 
historical data (Au et al, 2000). On the other hand, the research conducted in USA 
would typically use a larger sample, basing on the size of the country and the economy 
(Windolf, 2002). 
In the absence of study- or country-specific factors researchers tend to choose a 
sample of 100 non-financial firms and 25 financial institutions (van Veen and Kratzer, 
2011). Thus, the sample used for this study will follow this pattern, also because it 
facilitates the comparison with other countries. 
In consequence, the sample comprises the 125 largest corporations in Poland 
defined by their assets, with 100 of them being the largest non-financial and the other 
25, the top financial institutions in the country (15 banks and 10 insurance and fund 
management companies). The data set was constructed on the basis of information 
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contained in the ranking of the 500 largest companies in Poland published annually 
since 1992 (“Lista 500 – 2011”)
2
. Additional data on the economic characteristics of the 
analyzed corporations was obtained from their annual reports, as well as other 
publically available sources such as companies’ websites, etc. It is also important to 
mention that the list includes holdings and foreign firms, if only they meet the criterion 
of the size of the assets. 
For each company from the list the data on executive and non-executive 
(supervisory) positions was extracted from the National Court Registry
3
. The result was 
an extensive database with a total amount of 1092 board positions, including 513 
executive and 579 non-executive positions, which constituted the input data for 
conducting the network analysis based on the interlocking directorates. It is important, 
however, to remember that this study analyses the relations between the companies 
created through the interlocking directorates and not the interlocking directors 
themselves. 
The analysis was conducted accordingly to the methodology of Social Network 
Analysis (SNA), which examines the separate nodes of the network and the 
relationships between them. The results can be represented by the statistical measures 
describing the characteristics of the network, as well as depicted in graphical way as 
sociograms. From numerous publications on the SNA methodology the book 
“Exploratory Network Analysis with Pajek” (de Nooy et al, 2005) was chosen as a main 
reference for this study, because it not only provides an extensive tutorial on the SNA 
application (Pajek), but also summarizes the most important concepts used here. 
                                                             
2 http://www.lista500.polityka.pl/rankings/show  
3 http://www.krs-online.com.pl 
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In the course of analysis firstly the main features of the Polish network are described 
through the computation of the aggregate network indicators, in particular: the number 
of components, number of firms in the first component, number of isolates, number of 
ties and their density, different centrality measures. This allows to capture and model 
the general topography of the network and creates the ground for the second step of the 
analysis, where the comparative approach tries to place the Polish network in the 
context of other countries’ networks.  
All the necessary network statistics’ calculations were conducted using the Social 
Network Analysis (SNA) open source software called Pajek
4
 (de Nooy et al, 2005). 
 
Polish Corporate Network 
Composition of the Data Base 
The main questions underlying this research are to determine what kind of structure 
do the corporate networks in Poland have? Why the structure indeed looks like it looks? 
And what the consequences for the actual business system are? Before moving to the 
main topic however, several important remarks emerging from the database observation 
should be stated. 
Firstly, it is striking how many of the top companies operating in Poland are actually 
not Polish at all – almost 70% of them are foreign firms. Significant is also a low 
percentage of state owned enterprises (Table 1). This all can be seen as a result of the 
vast and buoyant privatisation in the early ‘90s, as well as consequence of the constant 
inflow of follow-up foreign direct investment in the later periods. 
 
                                                             
4 Download from: http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/pajek/ 
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Table 1. Nationality of Firms 
  Number of Firms Percentage 
Foreign Capital  85 68% 
Private Domestic Capital 30 24% 
Public Capital 10 8% 
Total 125 100% 
 
Regardless of the reasons underlying this situation, it is important to notice and 
include the foreign companies in the analysis, for it is a way to investigate whether they 
are going to influence the size and characteristics of the corporate network of the 
country.  
General Characteristics of the Polish Network 
The interlocking directorates are created only by the board members who hold two 
or more positions. In Poland, alike or even more significantly than in many other 
countries the multiple directors are still in minority. As shown in the Table 2, within the 
125 companies analyzed with the total number of 1092 board positions only 27 
interlocking directors were found. Most of them (over 92%) only hold two positions. 
Two directors sit simultaneously on the boards of three different companies and no 
director occupies four or more positions. The Polish network does not have the so-
called “heavy linkers” (Au et al, 2000) – the directors who are highly interlocked in a 
large number of boards, and consequently act as the network connectors. 
Furthermore, the companies in the network are linked with each other through a low 
density of connections (Table 2). Density can be explained as a ratio between the 
number of the ties observed and the total possible number of ties, given the number of 
analyzed companies. It measures the tightness of interorganizational connections and 
how cohesive the structure of the ties between the firms is (Santella, 2009). The 
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observed density of 0.0033 means that only 0.33% of all the possible connections are 
present. Such a low density index suggests that the Polish network is not very broad. 
Table 2. Network Indicators 
Number of Firms – N 125 
Number of Directors – D 1092 
Interlocks 27 
Interlocks (as % of D) 2,47% 
Interlocked Firms 35 
Interlocked Firms (as % of N) 28% 
Components 7 
Firms in the First Component 6 
Firms in the First Component (as % of N) 5% 
Isolates 90 
Isolates (as % of N) 72% 
Density 0,33% 
Degree Centrality 0,029373 
Betweenness Centrality 0,000899 
 
Figure 1 shows the configuration of the Polish network and graphically supports the 
above statement. Each of the vertices of the chart represents a company labelled with its 
acronym (see: Annex 1). Every line between two vertices signifies that at least one 
interlocking directorate occurs between the two companies.  
Several separate components and isolates of the network can be identified in the 
picture (Figure 1). Components can be defined as the sets of vertices through which it is 
possible to reach other vertices (de Nooy, 2005). In this sense the components are the 
sets constructed of three or more companies. The first component is the one with the 
highest number of linked vertices. On the other hand the companies not connected with 
any of the others will be called isolates. The Polish sample generated 7 separate 
components with the first component containing only 6 companies. Ninety companies, 
constituting 72% of the whole sample, are isolates (Table 2). The low number of firms 
in the biggest component of the network, as well as a high percentage of isolated firms 
indicate that the network is very fragmented – which is clearly visible in the Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. The Polish Network (2011) 
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Another important feature of the network is the strength of the existing connections. 
It is reflected in the multiplicity of the particular connection and is measured by the 
number of the interlocking directors between each particular pair of linked companies 
(Au, 2000). The Pajek Software generates a simple report on the number of single and 
multiple lines in the network. There are 26 lines in total in the Polish network – 22 
single and four multiple (Table 3). The highest value of the line equals to 3, which 
means that there are three interlocking directors sitting at the same time on the boards of 
the two analyzed companies. There are also three other lines with value of 2, however 
the vast majority of lines (over 84%) is single, which indicates in general a low level of 
the strength of the connections. 
Table 3. Multiple Relationships 
Total Number of Lines 26 
Number of Multiple Lines 4 
Proportion of Multiple Relationships 15% 
Lines with Value 1 22 
Lines with Value 2 3 
Lines with Value 3 1 
 
Besides looking at the general network characteristics it is also important to analyze 
its individual nodes and their specific position in the network. To this end, different 
centrality measures can be applied, aiming at showing to which extent the whole 
network is geared around just a few large components (Windolf, 2002). 
Firstly, the least sophisticated and most intuitive index has been taken into 
consideration – the degree centrality (Table 2). It represents the number of ties each 
node has with its “neighbours”. Since it does not take into consideration any other factor 
(e.g. centrality of the “neighbours”) it is just a local centrality measure and alone 
provides very little information about the network as whole. The analyzed node could 
indeed have a lot of ties, but as long as the nodes it is connected to do not present high 
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centrality as well, it could still lie on the peripheries of the network (de Nooy, 2005). 
Thus, to complete the analysis another index measuring how close one node is to every 
other node in the network should be used – the closeness centrality. The Polish network, 
however, is indeed so decentralized that the software is unable to calculate it. The last 
and the most sophisticated measure of centrality – betweenness defines the specific 
nodes’ importance to the network. The low level of betweenness centrality (Table 2) 
only proves that the Polish corporate network is not centralized.  
Basing on the abovementioned measures and the quantitative analysis the following 
discussion will focus on providing a qualitative interpretation for the factors and 
element that can be influential for or influenced by the national business system in 
Poland. 
Implications from and for the Business System 
The underlying questions for this part of the analysis are: how could the structural 
characteristics of the network be explained? How does the national business system 
influence the network configuration? Are there any specific companies that play a 
pivotal role in the network? 
Examining further the main components in the Polish networks there are several 
interesting findings to present. Firstly, the vast majority of the interlocking companies 
represent only two categories – the financial sector (which is not surprising and present 
in every study on interlocking directorates) and the chemical industry (Table 4). Out of 
27 companies in the main components of the Polish interlocking directorates’ network, 
10 are financial institutions, 9 operate strictly in the chemical industry, 6 are the large 
direct purchasers and processors of the chemical industry products and only two 
represent other segments. 
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Table 4. Firms with the Highest Number of Ties in the Network by Industry 
Acronym Name Number of ties Sector Capital Rank  
ZAK ZAK SA 4 Chemical Domestic 65 
BHAN Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA 3 Financial Foreign 10 
ZCP Zakłady Chemiczne Police SA 3 Chemical Public 94 
APTE Aviva PTE SA 2 Financial Foreign 7 
AXA AXA PTE SA 2 Financial Foreign 24 
BOR Boryszew SA 2 Chemical Domestic 48 
CANP Can-Pack SA 2 Metal Domestic 30 
FOD Firma Oponiarska Dębica SA 2 Metal Foreign 98 
PEKA Bank Pekao SA 2 Financial Foreign 2 
PKNO PKN Orlen SA 2 Chemical Domestic 16 
SODA Soda Polska Ciech sp. z o.o. 2 Chemical Domestic 101 
ZATM Zakłady Azotowe w Tarnowie-
Mościcach SA 
2 Chemical Domestic 69 
 
The interlocks created between those companies can be explained through the 
specific characteristics of the chemical industry put against different interlocking 
directorates’ theories. 
The theory says that the frequency of financial interlocking is directly related to the 
capital intensity of the corporation, when the capital is intermediated by financial 
institutions. The chemical industry is known to be highly capital-intensive. This 
provides a valid explanation to such a representation of banks and other financial 
institutions in the network composition. Corporations with large capital requirements 
naturally seek access to financial institutions (Allen, 1974) – in the Polish case Can-
Pack S.A. (CANP) and the bank Millennium S.A (MILL) in the second component can 
serve as an example. Moreover, the enterprises of the chemical industry in Poland are 
the prime example of large enterprises that were one of the main pillars of the 
communist state-owned and centralized economy. They had been operating for years 
completely inefficiently, accumulating losses and multimillion debts. The industry, 
however, presented high growth and profitability potential and so they were one of the 
first to be privatised. This could not, nevertheless, happen without the banks’ control 
(the credit suppliers), which is still visible today in the boards of directors of these 
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companies in the form of interlocking directorates, as for example in the companies 
from the first component of the network - ZAK S.A. (ZAK) and Bank Polskiej 
Spółdzielczości (BPS). 
Secondly, the industry is also highly resource-dependent. Therefore, following the 
resource control theory, interlocks would appear between companies operating in the 
same field, but also, on the other hand, between the chemicals producers and the 
chemicals processors to reduce the environmental uncertainty. Since the industry is 
producing mainly intermediate goods, the interlocks would naturally appear between the 
companies on a different level of the value chain to provide better coordination, control 
and information flow. An example of resource control driven interlocking can be seen 
between the companies Boryszew S.A. (BOR) and Impexmetal S.A. (IMP) with the 
latter one being a processor of the intermediate goods produced by the first. 
Crucial to mention is also the consolidation trend among the companies constituting 
the chemical industry in Poland. Accordingly to some economists (Balcerowicz, 1997) 
Polish chemical industry needs to be fully privatized, restructured and consolidated in 
order to be considered competitive in the foreign markets, with special regards to 
European Union. In this sense the interlocking directorates could be seen as a first step 
of the consolidation processes. For example, the companies from the first component of 
the Polish network – Zakłady Chemiczne Police S.A. (ZCP) and Zakłady Azotowe w 
Tarnowie-Mościcach S.A. (ZATM) have already started the process and are committed 
to go through with it, as well as to restructure the operations. 
It is also interesting to look at the companies that are not considered components, 
but as they are connected through one interlocking director it can be assumed that they 
are at the early stage of the formation of the network. Two main trends can be observed 
21 
 
here. First, alike in the chemical industry, the interlocking occurs between the crediting 
bank and the formerly state-owned inefficient, but later privatized and restructured 
enterprise, e.g. Bank PKO B.P. (PKO) and Zakłady Tłuszczowe Kruszwica S.A. (ZTK). 
The second trend involves interlocking between the companies in the same industry, but 
on a different stage of the value chain and can be explained by the strive to vertical 
integration, and its underlying theory of the resource control, e.g. Volkswagen Motor 
Polska Sp. z o.o. (VWGM, the producer of cars) and Sitech Sp. z o.o. (SITE, the 
producer of car seats). 
As mentioned before “business systems are naturally linked to the institutional 
environments in which they develop”. The examples quoted above clearly show that the 
Polish corporate network is deeply embedded in the environment in which it developed. 
As this environment and the institutions constantly change and evolve, the corporate 
network in Poland can be expected to follow the process of adaptation to economic, 
political and social institutions and subsequently change. The question here to answer is 
about the possible directions of those changes and so the following section tries to 
investigate them basing on a comparison of the Polish and German corporate networks. 
Governance System and Corporate Networks: A Comparison with Germany 
Germany was chosen as a country for comparative analysis with Poland for several 
different reasons. As it was mentioned before the interlocking directorates’ network is 
highly influenced by the business system in place, the economic, political and social 
institutions, and most importantly the type of governance regime. All of the above listed 
factors are indeed to an extent similar in both countries, and so provide a solid 
background for a comparative analysis. 
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The data on the German network used in the comparison comes from the research 
on the director’s networks in France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom (Santella, 
2009), and the Windolf’s (2002) comparison of the corporate networks in Europe and 
the United States. 
Table 5. Poland and Germany: Network Indicators Comparison 
  Poland Germany 
Number of Firms 125 125 
Interlocks 27 242 
Components 7 2 
Firms in the First Component 6 38 
Firms in the First Component (as % of N) 5% 30% 
Density 0,33% 19,84% 
Degree Centrality 0,029373 14 
Betweenness Centrality 0,000899 8,219 
Proportion of multiple relationships 15% 21,20% 
                      Source: Windolf, 2002; Santella et al, 2009. 
 
Table 5 shows the main network indicators for the Polish and German network. The 
differences in most of the indices are striking. Within the same number of companies 
the German network exhibits over 200 more interlocking directorates than the Polish 
one. While the power of connections measured by the percentage of multiple 
relationships is stronger, but not significantly, the companies in Germany are linked 
with each other through a much higher density of connections. The German network is 
also more centralized, which can be seen both, in the centrality measures, but also in the 
fact, that the network has only two components, with the first connecting 30% of all the 
analyzed companies (whereas in Poland it is only 5%). 
Those differences may seem surprising, taking into consideration the similarities in 
terms of the institutional and business context that the two countries exhibit. However, 
it is important to remember that the formation of the Polish network has begun much 
later and in a rather harder economic situation than it had in Germany.  
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It is hard to judge how the Polish network will develop in the following years. The 
situation should be monitored and reviewed in the future to provide valid information 
about the directions and reasons behind the network formation. Basing on the German 
example, however, it can be assumed that the Polish network will continue to grow, 
both in terms of size, and density. Poland, indeed, seems to be economically moving in 
the same direction as Germany, only the changes and adjustments happen a little later 
(Nowak, 2008). It is also possible that the future developments in the Polish corporate 
network will be more strategically rather than tactically dictated. So far the observed 
interlocks are determined mainly by the finance- or resource-based reasons. As the 
network develops other reasons are being observed, such as horizontal or vertical 
integration (e.g. the consolidation of the chemical industry). 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the Polish corporate network through the 
study of interlocking directorates in 125 largest companies in the country. The main 
goals were to: recognize the characteristics of the network, find the main factors that 
determine those characteristics and identify the implications for the business 
environment in Poland. 
The Polish network exhibited a low number of interlocks, low density and strength 
of the connections, as well as very low centrality. The analysis showed that the network 
is neither broad, nor tight, but very fragmented. The low level of interrelationship can 
be seen as an effect of the novelty of the business structure – the corporate network is 
actually emerging in this period. Naturally so, the first and strongest trends in the 
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network are linked with the economic transformation of 1990s – mainly the 
privatization. 
Such a narrow network brings several implications for doing business in Poland. 
Firstly, it suggests that there is no business elite in the country, so the control is not 
concentrated in the hands of few individuals. Secondly, the low level of centrality 
implies that the information does not stream within the network (with exception of the 
chemical industry). Indeed, high centrality of a network implies faster and easier 
information flow. Moreover, it is important to notice that even though the sample 
consists in almost 70% of foreign firms, the interlocking directorates in Poland are 
rather industry-related and not influenced by the nationality of capital. The interlocking 
directorates in this context cannot be seen as means of overcoming the liability of 
foreignness. On contrary, the high proportion of foreign firms seems to act as a factor 
enhancing segmentation and fragmentation of the network. 
All things considered, it is important to remember that the creation of network is 
still in progress, as is the business system, and so further developments in the nearest 
future can be expected.  
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